

## INGLÊS

### TRANSLATION PART A

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from George Orwell's "Homage to Catalonia".

[value: 20 marks]

In winter on the Zaragoza front, except at night, when a surprise attack was always conceivable, nobody bothered about the enemy. They were merely remote black insects whom one occasionally glimpsed hopping to and fro. The prime concern of both sides was essaying to keep warm. The things one normally associates with the horrors of war seldom raised their ugly heads. Um in the hills it was simply the mingled boredom and discomfort of stationary warfare. A life as uneventful as a city clerk's, and almost as regular. Atop each hill, knots of ragged, grimy men shivering round their flag. And all day and night, the senseless bullets and shells wandering across the empty valleys and only by some fluke getting home on a human body.

I would gaze round the wintry landscape marveling at the futility, the inconclusiveness of such a kind of war. Could you forget that every mountain-top was occupied by troops and thus littered with tin cans and crusted with dung, the scenery was stupendous.

George Orwell. **Homage to Catalonia**. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975, pp. 25 – 26.

### **Roberto Szatmari (16,50/20)**

No inverno, na frente de Zaragoza, ninguém se preocupava com o inimigo, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre plausível. Os inimigos eram apenas pequenos insetos distantes, que eventualmente eram avistados, saltitando para lá e para cá. A preocupação central, de ambos os lados, era apenas tentar se manter aquecido. As coisas normalmente associadas aos horrores da guerra raramente se faziam presentes. Nos morros, havia apenas a mistura de tédio e desconforto de uma guerra estática. Uma vida quase tão monótona quanto a de um escrivão na cidade e quase tão regrada. No topo de cada morro, aglomerados de homens sujos e em farrapos tremiam ao redor de sua bandeira. Todo o dia e toda a noite as balas e cartuchos sem sentido passavam pelos vales desertos, só atingindo algum corpo humano por sorte.

Eu observava a paisagem invernal, admirando a futilidade, a falta de conclusão desse tipo de guerra. Se fosse possível esquecer que cada cume estava ocupado por tropas e, logo, coberto de latas e imundo de fezes, a vista era maravilhosa.

### Adriano Giacomet de Aguiar (12,5/20)

Durante o inverno no fronte de Saragoça, exceto à noite, quando um ataque era **sempre** possível, ninguém se incomodava com o inimigo. Eles eram meros insetos pretos os quais alguém ocasionalmente percebia pulando de um lado a outro. A maior preocupação dos dois lados era tentar **manterem-se** aquecidos. As coisas normalmente associadas aos horrores da guerra raramente **levantava as cabeças feias deles**. Em cima das montanhas era somente a monotinia e o desconforto da guerra estacionária. Uma vida tão sem emoções quanto a de um funcionário da cidade, e quase tão regular. No cume de cada montanha, aglomerados de homens **furiosos** e **pálidos** tremendo ao redor de sua bandeira. E por todo dia e noite, as balas e as **cápsulas** sem sentido passeando através do vales vazios e somente com alguma sorte **voltando para casa** em um corpo humano.

Eu olhava ao redor da paisagem de inverno contemplando a futilidade, e o aspecto inconclusivo de uma guerra como essa. **Não dá** para esquecer que cada topo da montanha era ocupada por tropas e por isso suja com latas e repleta de fezes, a paisagem era estupenda.

### Camilla Neves Moreira (12,5/20)

No inverno na frente de batalha de Zaragoza, ninguém se incomodava com os inimigos, exceto à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era sempre possível de imaginar. Eles eram meramente remotos insetos negros para quem, ocasionalmente, se olhava rapidamente com desdenho. A principal preocupação de ambos os lados era esforçar-se para manter-se aquecido. As coisas que, normalmente, se associa aos horrores da guerra raramente apareciam. Lá nas colinas, estavam apenas o tédio desanimador e o desconforto da guerra parada. Uma vida tão sem acontecimentos quanto a de um tabelião da prefeitura, e quase tão regular. No topo de cada colina, grupos de homens infelizes e em trapos reuniam-se ao redor de suas bandeiras. E, todo o dia e toda a noite, as balas e as cápsulas sem sentido vagavam pelos vales vazios e somente por azar se alojavam em um corpo humano.

Eu olhava a paisagem de inverno chocado com a futilidade, a inconclusão desse tipo de guerra. Poder-se-ia esquecer que o cume de cada montanha estava ocupado por tropas e abarrotado, portanto, com o lixo das latas de comida processada e encrostado por dejetos, o cenário era estupendo.

### PIOR NOTA (5,5/20)

Durante o inverno, ninguém se importava com o inimigo no **front** de Saragoça, a não ser à noite, quando um ataque surpresa era **sempre** possível. Eles eram meros insetos negros remotos, dentre os quais um eventualmente **brilhava, piscando**. A maior preocupação de ambos os lados era tentar permanecer aquecido. As coisas que normalmente se associa aos horrores da guerra raramente **despertavam suas cabeças feias**. No alto das montanhas, o que havia era, simplesmente, o suave tédio e desconforto de uma guerra **estagnada**. Uma vida tão desprovida de acontecimentos, e quase tão regular, quanto uma **cidade clerical**. Ao topo de cada montanha, porções de homens **exaustos e obscuros** tremiam ao redor de sua bandeira. E todos os dias e noites, as balas sem sentido vagavam sobre os vales vazios e, apenas por algum incidente, chegavam ao destino de um corpo humano.

Eu poderia **olhar indefinidamente** a gélida paisagem, **maravilhando-me** com a futilidade, a inconclusividade desse tipo de guerra. A cena seria estupenda, se possível fosse esquecer que cada topo de montanha estava ocupado por tropas e, portanto, **iluminado com latas de pólvora**.

## **TRANSLATION PART B**

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Foreign Minister Celso Lafer's lecture at Instituto Rio Branco in april 2001.

**[value: 15 marks]**

O novo ambiente internacional e seus cenários de conflito tornaram inadequadas as doutrinas de dissuasão nuclear e do “equilíbrio do terror”, e, assim, passaram a ser ainda mais difíceis de justificar a retenção e o desenvolvimento de arsenais nucleares. Se aparentemente amainaram os riscos de uma conflagração atômica na escala contemplada à época da guerra fria, seguramente aumentaram os perigos difusos da violência de natureza descontrolada. Tais perigos aumentaram em função de uma faceta da globalização, que faz funcionar o mundo através de diversos tipos de redes. Entre estas estão as das finanças, que possibilitam, além dos movimentos rápidos dos fluxos de capital, a “lavagem” de dinheiro; as do crime organizado; as do tráfico de armas e de drogas; as do terrorismo; as das migrações clandestinas de pessoas, causadas por guerras e perseguições. No caso do Brasil, em função da porosidade das fronteiras, esses riscos provêm, em parte, do impacto interno, no território nacional, de fatores externos.

**Roberto Szatmari (13,50/20)**

The new international environment and its scenarios of conflict have made the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and of the “balance of terror” inadequate. Thus, it has become even harder to justify the continued possession and development of nuclear arsenals. If, apparently, the risks of a nuclear conflict on the scale envisaged during the Cold War have decreased, the diffuse dangers have increased due to an aspect of globalization, which makes the world work by means of several kinds of networks. Among these are finance networks, which, beyond enabling for rapid capital flows, also enable money laundering, organized crime networks, drug and arms trafficking networks, terrorist networks and networks for clandestine migrations, caused by war and persecution. In the case of Brazil, due to the porous nature of the borders, these risks arise, in part, from external factors, which have internal impacts on the national territory.

## Helges Bandeira (10/15)

The new international environment and its **possible conflicts**<sup>2</sup> have made the doctrines of nuclear dissuasion and of “**terror balance**”<sup>3</sup> inadequate, thus making it more difficult to justify the retention and (the)<sup>4</sup> development of nuclear arsenals. If the risks of an atomic conflagration **in**<sup>5</sup> the scale contemplated at the time of the Cold War have apparently dwindled, the diffuse dangers **the uncontrolled nature of the violence**<sup>6</sup> have certainly risen. Such dangers have risen due to **an**<sup>7</sup> aspect of globalization, which makes the world work through several types of networks. Among them are the finance networks, which besides **fast**<sup>8</sup> capital flows make money laundering possible; the organized crime networks; the drug and arms trafficking **network**<sup>9</sup>; the terrorism networks; the networks of clandestine people migration, caused by wars and persecutions. In the case of Brazil, due to its porous borders, these risks are partially engendered **from**<sup>10</sup> the internal impact of external factor in its national territory.

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<sup>2</sup> o candidato recorreu e a banca respondeu: Linhas 1 e 2 - Recursos indeferidos. The candidate's argument here clearly confirms the fact that the phrase should have been translated as "conflict scenarios".

<sup>3</sup> a banca descontou um ponto por traduzir mal a expressão

<sup>4</sup> a banca colocou the entre parênteses, mas não tirou ponto

<sup>5</sup> o candidato errou a preposição e perdeu meio ponto

<sup>6</sup> o candidato não traduziu parte da frase

<sup>7</sup> a banca sublinhou "an", mas não retirou ponto

<sup>8</sup> o candidato recorreu e a banca respondeu: Linha 13 - Recurso indeferido. The mark was deducted for a non-collocational word choice. "Fast" does not collocate with "capital flows"; "rapid" or "swift" would have been adequate choices.

<sup>9</sup> a banca sublinhou, mas não descontou pelo uso do singular

<sup>10</sup> o candidato errou a preposição e perdeu meio ponto

### **Pedro Guerreiro Lopes Da Silveira (9/15)**

The international environment and its **scenarios** of conflict have made the doctrine of nuclear dissuasion and that of “the balance of terror” old-fashioned, and, therefore, holding and developing nuclear weapons have become even harder to justify. If apparently the risks of an atomic conflagration **in** the scale considered during the Cold War times have been negotiated, for sure, the **difuse** danger of uncontrolled violence has increased. This danger has increased due to a particular side of globalisation, which makes the world work through various kinds of **nets**. Among them, there are those of finance, which enable, apart from the rapid movements of capital flows, “**money-washing**”; those of **the** organized crime; those of the **traffic of** weapons and drugs; those of terrorism; those of non-official migrations, which are caused by wars and persecutions. In the case of Brazil, due to the fragility of its borders, these risks in part stem from the internal impact of external factors in **the** national territory.

### MENOR NOTA (0,5/15)

The new international environment and its scenarios of conflict **outdated** the doctrines of nuclear deterrence and of “balance of terror”, and, therefore, it has become even more difficult to justify the **control** and the development of nuclear arsenals. If they apparently diminished the risks of an atomic conflict **in the escalation characterized** during the cold war, they surely increased the diffuse dangers of **the** violence of **uncontrolled** nature. Those perils increased as the result of a characteristic of globalization, which makes the world **works** through multiple kinds of **nets**. Among these nets are the financial ones, which make possible, besides the fast traffic of the flux of capital, **the** money “laundering”; that of organized crime; that of the **traffic** of drugs and arms; that of terrorism; that if illegal migration of people, caused by wars and persecutions. In the Brazilian case, due to the porosity of its borders, those risks **stems from, to a certain degree**, the domestic impact, in **the** national territory, of foreign factors.

## COMPOSITION

The most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and calm that is not easily disturbed. It is just these intense conflicts and their conflagration which are needed to produce valuable and lasting results.

Carl Gustav Jung. The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche. **The Collected Works**. V.8. Routledge: London, 1960. P. 26

**In light of the quote above, comment on the possible positive effects, if any, of different conflicts throughout the twentieth century.**

(value: 50 marks)

**Roberto Szatmari (45,50/50)<sup>11</sup>**

Throughout history, many thinkers have argued that crises and conflicts have positive effects for progress and civilization. German philosopher Hegel compared nations to trees, which occasionally needed to be shaken to be cleared of dead leaves. Proposed benefits of conflicts have included everything from technological development to increased unity and moral edification. As our economic and political analyses improve, however, these views seem increasingly quixotic and untenable.

It is certainly true that the need to best your opponent in a conflict creates a demand for innovation rarely seen in peacetime. The need to break German codes in World War II led to the invention of the first computers and the Manhattan Project drove advances in theoretical physics that went far beyond the creation of the atom bomb.

Another argument suggests that conflicts bring more intangible benefits to populations, by boosting morale and providing a sense of purpose. In this view, Americans in the Cold War enjoyed a sense of kinship with others in the western bloc and their struggles in their daily lives could be seen as part of a broader struggle to prove that their model of society was the superior one. This reflected in the space race, in Hollywood films and in the Olympics.

A third argument claims that it is not the conflict itself that brings prosperity, but its aftermath. A return of soldiers from the front could boost demand and the end of the war effort would raise supply accordingly, driving economic growth. More importantly, the post-conflict world would build new institutions to guarantee lasting progress, such as the creation of the UN and the Bretton Woods system.

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<sup>11</sup> Por problemas técnicos, não será possível apontar onde estão os erros gramaticais.

All of these views contain some truth, yet all vastly understate the damage brought by conflict. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they tend to be formulated in times of peace and prosperity, not war.

In Europe, pre-World War I levels of growth and prosperity were only matched late in the twentieth century. Political freedoms, in some areas, were not re-established until the end of the Cold War. In conflicts on the periphery of the Cold War, such as in Africa and in Southeast Asia, it is hard to argue for any plausible benefits at all.

Further, technological progress has been proceeding at an extraordinary pace ever since the IT revolution, much of which happened after the end of the Cold War.

Upon more careful analysis, it is clear that conflicts bring guaranteed strife and uncertain benefits. Rather than looking to conflict as a necessary catharsis, it is more important to recognize the positive effects of peace and stability and to always bear in mind the devastating human cost of the twentieth century conflicts.

Organização e desenvolvimento de ideias: 18/20

Qualidade de linguagem: 9,5/10

Correção gramatical: 18/20

## Camilla Neves Moreira (34,5/50)

A hundred years after the beginning of the First World War, debates over conflicts are on the rise. In the twentieth century, the concert of nations witnessed more than its fair share of wars and conflicts between countries. Generations had to learn how to contend with the horrors of war and were long haunted by the memories of those times. Academic theories were developed to try to explain how rational beings could be capable of so much destruction. Despite the well-known negative effects of conflicts, they can also have positive impacts on communities and on the international scene.

Although ethnic differences and political disputes **might** split countries apart, some conflicts can stimulate closer social ties in nations which are facing a foreign enemy. This stems from a sense of solidarity and collectiveness which derives from the shared experiences of hiding and trying to survive in times of war. The United Kingdom epitomises this **possibility**: in the Second World War, Germany **strongly** bombed the country, with the purpose of creating political unrest and instability, which would make the United Kingdom an easier target. Nonetheless, the woes caused by the attacks brought people together and spurred its community to work in **unissom** so as to defeat Germany.

**In** a broader perspective, intense conflicts can result in a strong commitment to peace. The aftermath of the Second World War and the international commitment to prevent new conflicts represent the backdrop which allowed the inception of the United Nations in 1945. After the horrors of this war, the concert of nations decided to create an international organisation with the **quintessencial** purpose of guaranteeing lasting international peace. Moreover, the genocides and the crimes of war that were perpetrated by the Nazis stimulated the development of an international regime to protect humans rights. Therefore, one of the worst conflicts in history fostered the creation of an international system to protect humanity from the menaces of warfare.

Carl Jung had already indicated the possibility of positive outcomes stemming from intense conflicts. Even though his perspective is based on the analyses of individuals, this notion can be applied to countries and even to the international community. The Second World War left to the United Kingdom a legacy of collectiveness which allowed the country to **cross** the hurdles imposed by this war. In addition, the conflicts in the twentieth century brought nations together in the effort to prevent political disputes from becoming full-scale wars. Therefore, not only have past conflicts fostered the current international commitment to lasting peace, but they also **showed** humanity the paramount importance of the task.

Organização e desenvolvimento de ideias: 15/20

Qualidade da linguagem: 6,5/10

Correção gramatical: 13/20

### **Pedro Ivo Souto Dubra (34,5/50)**

That the twentieth century was a **conflictuous** period is undeniable. Not only was it perceived as a bloody instant of history, but it was also considered a time of potential peace. In those years, Realism and Idealism flourished, which corroborates the argument that the “Age of Extremes” was quite ambivalent. An informed analysis of the possible positive effects of different conflicts throughout the twentieth century will bear fruit only if two aspects are not neglected: the possibility of learning from wars and the need for changing the international system that emerged from that period.

In his writings about the Psyche, Carl Jung advocated that intense conflicts could have productive effects. If overcome, they would pave the way for a valuable sense of security, which could positively last. World War II seems to have contradicted Jung’s standpoint, inasmuch as one could argue that mankind learned nothing from the 1914-1918 events. Nevertheless, that is not entirely true. Wilson’s Points were taken into account in the ambit of the United Nations creation, even if Realism has been prevailing since 1945. Statesmen such as Churchill were firmly decided not to fall prey to a new Hitler. Public opinion started to put pressure on national leaders, **namely** from the 1960s on, as the example of the Vietnam War demonstrates. Moreover, the Cold War can be described as an effort towards equilibrium. As Jung shrewdly suggested, conflicts can teach something, and mankind seemed capable of learning something from them throughout the twentieth century.

The need for changing the international system that derived from the last century also lies at the core of the discussion on the possible positive effects of conflicts. Albeit relatively efficient, that order must be shifted. Should **not** the Security Council be reformed, potential conflicts may emerge. The post-World War II configuration of power is no longer acceptable, and the proposals of reforms **sustained** by countries such as Brazil and India should not fade into the background. As both **world wars** taught men who lived in the twentieth century, conflicts may emerge from peaceful contexts. In that sense, preventive diplomacy is a topic of great germaneness, inasmuch as it paves the way for long-lasting peace by gathering information and advising national leaders.

Mankind always learns something from past experiences. In that sense, the twentieth century, full of contrasts, had much to teach. Millions were unfortunately killed so as to show that peace should not be taken for granted. Moreover, the order that emerged from that period, in spite of its relatively stable basis, must be reformed in order to prevent new conflicts.

Organização e desenvolvimento de ideias: 13/20

Qualidade da linguagem: 6/10

Correção gramatical: 15,5/20

## PIOR NOTA (23,5/50)<sup>12</sup>

The twentieth century was the bloodiest in recorded history. Its first half **encompassed** two World Wars; in its second half, a plethora of small conflicts ravaged underdeveloped nations, particularly in Africa. It is not safe to assume that all the conflicts which took place throughout the twentieth century **have produced** positive effects. In some cases, they did; in others, they jeopardized state sovereignty and national cohesion, leaving behind nothing but chaos.

A long and cruel war can **bring forward** the preciousness of peace. High death tolls and **V** exhaustion of resources make states and national societies more willing not only to celebrate peace, but also to avert new quagmires that **would** lead to conflict. In no other region **this choice has been** more enthusiastically embraced than in Europe. After the second World War, rivalries between France and Germany gave way to integrating efforts that addressed the cultural, economic and social issues that once had led to the worst carnage ever **registered**.

Although **servicing** as a beacon to guide other international **integrating** efforts, Europe has a dynamics of its own. Other regions did not fare that well in post-conflict scenarios. **V** Positive effects of war are more likely to appear when societies are galvanized **towards** the pursuit of peace. Should conflict affect the very fabric of societies, it **would be** harder to sustain broad arrangements for lasting peace. The civil **strifes** that ravaged African countries such as Somalia, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau **still are** being dealt with by the African Union, which **is focused in** providing the means for those states to achieve peace within their territories.

The comparison between European and African panoramas reveals that different conflicts throughout the twentieth century have produced different results. When these conflicts **have affected** well-formed, fully-fledged national societies, such as the European ones, a lasting peace could follow the end of war; conversely, should the strife tear up national cohesion, which **happened** in Africa, positive outcomes **are** not so easy to spot. The African Union, for instance, is rather a collective answer to **dire instability** than a benefit from those conflicts.

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<sup>12</sup> Comentários do autor: Observações do primeiro examinador (conteúdo): "Well thought of comparison – Europe x Africa. Sound structure and development of ideas". Dois pontos a menos em gramática, a redação sequer teria sido corrigida. Cometi erros diversos, variados e sortidos, de colocação, de escolha vocabular, de ortografia. Creio que o conteúdo salvou a redação. Sugestão aos candidatos: preocupem-se com a gramática, ela é fundamental; mas não descuidem do conteúdo, ele pode salvar sua prova.

**Beyond** political instability, conflicts in Africa also left a dark legacy of lack of infrastructure and **undedevelopment**. Eventually, Africa might finally overcome the challenges derived from the **twetieth**-century conflicts. Some countries such as South Africa and Nigeria have achieved stability and have prospered. Nonetheless, the healing of the African wounds will be a substantially different process **than** that of the Europeans.

Organização e desenvolvimento de ideias: 15/20

Qualidade de linguagem: 6,5/10

Correção gramatical: 2/20

## SUMMARY

Write a summary, **in no more than 200 words**, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael S. Lund's 1995 Foreign Affairs article "Underrating Preventive Diplomacy"

(value: 15 marks)

The malaise of U.S. foreign policy is such that academic gadflies now debunk any proposal sounding suspiciously positive. The charge is that proponents of preventive diplomacy oversell its potential, and naive policymakers are taking the bait. It is argued that problems of prescience, policy prescription, and political support mean the "intractable" conflicts "endemic" to the post-Cold War period cannot be averted unless major resources are invested in situations where risks are high and success is doubtful. Preventive diplomacy, the contention runs, merely means that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

Scaremongers conjure up a nightmare in which zealous purveyors of preventive diplomacy mesmerize unwitting policymakers into buying a discount antidote for local quagmires, one with little potency and hidden side effects. Yet responsible proponents of preventive diplomacy obviously do not presume easy solutions to such disasters can be found, nor do they advise key players to do something, just anything, in dealing with incipient conflicts, tout preventive diplomacy as a cure-all with no cost or risk, or assume no value judgments need be made. Not only do the scaremongers distort the views being expressed but they insult policymakers by implying they would fall for such policy nostrums.

Advocacy of a policy is confounded with adoption of the substance behind it. The fact preventive diplomacy is a buzzword of foreign policy does not imply that early warning and conflict prevention have become official doctrine or standard operating procedure. The term "preventive diplomacy" refers to actions or institutions that are used to keep political disputes arising between or within nations from escalating into armed force. These efforts are needed when and where existing international relations or national politics fail to manage tensions without violence erupting. They come into play before a point of confrontation, sustained violence, or military action is reached.

The claim is that while we know the societal conditions that stoke the chances of war or state collapse (e.g., poverty, environmental degradation, ethnic and economic divisions, and repressive, corrupt regimes, and so forth), murky individual and group decisions make it impossible to predict exactly when

and where violence will surface. But just because political forecasting is not rocket science does not disqualify it. Unheralded acts, such as a military coup or a terrorist bombing, are very difficult to forecast. Early-warning specialists are, though, making progress in pinning down the probable precipitants of more gradual, phenomena, such as ethnic conflict, genocide, and the breakdown of states. Demonstrations, repressive measures, hate rhetoric, arms build-ups, separatist communities forming parallel institutions: these signs one ignores at one's peril.

In Estonia, for example, restrictive citizenship and language laws adopted in 1993 by the newly-independent government were perceived by resident Russian speakers – then a third of Estonia's population – as discriminatory and threatening. Mindful of this group's powerful patron next door, the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other governmental and private actors took preventive steps to allay tensions.

The rub, so the argument runs, lies in knowing what actions to take. But preventive strategy is not the stab in the dark some observers insinuate. The blanket view that ethnic tensions uniformly lead to intractable conflicts is based on a few recent instances where, despite efforts to avoid it, violence has ensued: Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. One should look, instead, at the numerous ethnic and national disputes deemed potentially destabilizing and menacing that were actually managed in relative peace: Russia and Ukraine over Crimea, the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Congo's transition from autocracy, Zambia's non-violent shift toward democracy, and Hungary's moderated relations with its neighbors, among others. Such success stories are virtually ignored. Only two policy options ("little more than talking" or armed force) are mooted, whereas governments and NGOs have resorted to a gamut of measures to influence parties in disputes.

One may well be skeptical that preventive action would save more lives, cost less, and obviate the need for humanitarian intervention. No need, still, to go to the opposite extreme, wherein the financial and political cost of preventing such crises is prohibitive. The logic of conflict escalation is prima facie support for the view that less violent and short-lived disputes offer much greater opportunities for peaceful management by mediators. Issues in those types of disputes tend to be simple and singular, disputants are less rigidly polarized and politically mobilized, fatalities (and thus passions) are low, and communications and common institutions may have survived. Other states or external groups are less likely to have taken sides and may even share an interest in keeping local disputes from burgeoning.

The calculus of deciding whether preventive diplomacy is worth the price must comprehend the costs of alternatives such as mid-conflict intervention and

non-involvement. That covers not only lives lost and injuries but also the price of humanitarian relief, refugee aid, and peacekeeping. It should also include the cost of losses in health, education, infrastructure, trade and investment opportunities, and natural resources.

The feeling is that the public will not endorse preventive diplomacy's risks and costs, but the considerations described above cast the issue of "political will" in a different light. Preventive efforts are often much less challenging and more prosaic than cases in which a government must endeavor to rouse the country to expose troops to possible danger abroad. For example, the dispatch of 500 American soldiers to join the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Macedonia was hardly noticed. Were preventive diplomacy to prosper, incipient conflicts would not even reach the desks of the National Security Council, the State Department's upper echelons, and the Pentagon.

Rather than ignore potential crises and threats out of some unexamined theory of their imagined intractability, policymakers might prudently track emerging political disputes around the world and develop policy options for addressing them promptly as opposed to belatedly. That would enable decision-makers to better assess whether they should act, when, with what means, and with whom. As successes mount, the burden of proof will shift those who would still defend the notion that current wait-and-see policies and practices are best. The stakes in the potential crises are simply too high for such options to be dismissed with cavalier analyses carping on about a few frustrating experiences.

Michael S. Lund, **Underrating Preventive Diplomacy**.  
Foreign Affairs, July/August 1995 issue. Available at:  
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51214/michael-s-lund/underrating-preventivediplomacy>. Retrieved on  
27.03.2014

### **Roberto Szatmari (14/15)**

Naysayers in academia dismiss the value of preventive diplomacy by assuming it is ineffective in the face of post-Cold War challenges. They claim that preventive diplomacy proponents treat the policy as a panacea while ignoring its risks. The critics, however, conflate the actual tenets of preventive diplomacy – preventing disputes from escalating – with the superficial adoption of preventive diplomacy as a policy slogan. They claim that the difficulty in predicting the outbreak of violence makes the policy ineffective. The counterargument is that, thanks to specialists' efforts, predictability is improving.

While in many cases of ethnic violence conflict ensued, claiming that violence is inevitable ignores several other instances in which conflict was avoided. Short disputes are particularly prone to peaceful mediation. The choice

for preventive diplomacy should involve a cost-benefit analysis of its value compared to that of the alternatives. The lower costs of preventive diplomacy also mean it is more easily accepted by national populations. It is, therefore, more useful for policymakers to improve their information gathering and to develop early responses to crises than to assume that the crises are unsolvable. The growing success of preventive diplomacy will make it progressively harder for critics to contend that inaction is the best course of action.

### **Flávio Beicker (12,5/15)**

Academic researchers are critical of preventive diplomacy, which has had great influence on US foreign policymakers. They hold that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the solution for international problems requires major resources and that preventive diplomacy only speeds up the deepening of a crisis.

Those who seriously propose preventive actions, however, do not assume that there are cost and risk-free solutions for entanglements. Preventive diplomacy comprises the deployment of diplomatic means to prevent an escalation in international or domestic disputes, thus avoiding violence or military action.

Political scientists have improved methods of predicting the surge of ethnic conflicts or the threshold of state collapse. In Estonia, for instance, preventive actions managed to ease tensions arisen by laws deemed threatening to minorities. One should not turn a blind eye to examples in which preventive diplomacy has silently succeeded. This demands an evaluation of the risks and alternatives available and is more likely to succeed in the beginning of a crisis.

Instead of neglecting potential crises, policymakers should monitor emerging disputes and conceive strategies to address them. Only through success preventive diplomacy can enjoy widespread acceptance.

\* expressões sublinhadas pela banca, sem marcação explicativa.

### Clarissa De Souza Carvalho (12/15)

A 1995 Foreign Affairs article supports preventive diplomacy and counters the arguments of those who favor reactive armed responses. Critics of preventive diplomacy say it is expensive, uncertain and risky. You just bring defeat forward by adopting it, and unwanted consequences might ensue, due to its **unefficient** methods. The article retorts that these arguments are misleading, as they suppose that policymakers lack critical thinking. Preventive diplomacy is neither naïve nor a one-size-fits-all solution. It aims at defuse domestic and international conflicts before they become widespread wars.

Anticipating conflicts' place and time is impossible, despite knowing their structural causes. Social strifes, however, are more predictable than terrorist attacks, as decisions related to the latter lack transparency. Early-warning systems also help in the first case. Despite such episodes as Rwanda, preventive diplomacy has successful cases to show, although people often forget them. Acknowledging the challenges to preventive diplomacy, one should not favor its antipode.

Assessing the benefits of diplomatic solutions, the costs of armed responses must be considered. Diplomacy means less troops abroad and less challenges to top-rank security institutions. Officials should therefore anticipate conflicts inasmuch as possible and react soon, so supporters of armed responses will have to justify their preferences.

## PIOR NOTA (4/15)

Preventive diplomacy has been discussed within the framework of United States foreign policy issues. Someone **consider** that the proposal is overvaluated, as it is naive, weak and non comprehensive. Others say that prevention is not a **standart** procedure, indeed it is just a tool to prevent forecasted conflicts. The very fact is when and which this actions have to be taken.

Some conflicts could be predicted, as succesful experiences can illustrate. Situations that cannot be forecasted do not **desqualify** the whole policy. Even in some cases there **are** less **space** to prevention and intervention, so less rigid conflicts can offer great oportuniteis to this kink of diplomacy.

**Finantial** costs have **been also** discussed. Prevention can cost less, but in some cases the price is prohibitive. Nevertheless, there are things that make the calculus hard to be done, such as injuries and humanitarian relief. Risks have also to be considered.

Public support seems to be hard to achieve. Prevention efforts are less challenging than big military interventions, indeed. Thus, prevention should not be ignored. **Track** potential crisis and develop policies **have** to be done, in order to **adress** conflicts. Past experiences cannot determine current actions.

*“weak summary and language”*

1: 0,5 / 2: 0,5 / 3: 0,5 / 4: 0,5 / 5: 1 / 6: 0,5

use of English: 0,5