

INGLÊS

A prova de Inglês, com o valor máximo de 100 (cem) pontos, constará de três partes: versão de um ou mais textos (valor: 25 pontos); tradução de um ou mais textos (valor: 25 pontos); e redação a respeito de tema de ordem geral, com extensão de 350 a 450 palavras (valor: 50 pontos).

Será apenada a redação que desobedecer à extensão mínima de palavras, deduzindo-se 0,20 ponto para cada palavra que faltar para atingir o mínimo exigido de 350. Será atribuída nota 0 (zero) à redação, caso o candidato não se atenha ao tema proposto ou obtenha pontuação 0 (zero) na avaliação da correção gramatical.

A legibilidade é condição essencial para a correção da prova.

Programa:

1. Redação em língua inglesa: expressão em nível avançado; domínio da gramática; qualidade e propriedade no emprego da linguagem; organização e desenvolvimento de idéias.
2. Versão do Português para o Inglês: fidelidade ao texto-fonte; respeito à qualidade e ao registro do texto-fonte; correção morfossintática e lexical.
3. Tradução do Inglês para o Português: fidelidade ao texto-fonte; respeito à qualidade e ao registro do texto-fonte; correção morfossintática e lexical.

Orientação para estudo

1. Versão (25 pontos)

A versão do Português para o Inglês deve ser feita de forma fidedigna, respeitando a qualidade e o registro do texto original. Subtrai-se 1 (um) ponto para cada um dos seguintes erros: falta de correspondência ao(s) texto(s)-fonte, erros gramaticais, escolhas errôneas de palavras e estilo inadequado. Erros de pontuação ou de ortografia serão apenados em 0,5 (meio) ponto.

2. Tradução (25 pontos)

A tradução do Inglês para o Português deve ser feita de forma fidedigna, respeitando a qualidade e o registro do texto original. Subtrai-se 1 (um) ponto para cada um dos seguintes erros: falta de correspondência ao(s) texto(s)-fonte, erros gramaticais, escolhas errôneas de palavras e estilo inadequado. Erros de pontuação ou de ortografia serão apenados em 0,5 (meio) ponto.

3. Redação (50 pontos)

Os candidatos devem demonstrar conhecimento avançado de Inglês e capacidade de usá-lo em redação bem estruturada. A distribuição dos 45 pontos faz-se da seguinte maneira:

- Correção gramatical (20 pontos)

Avaliam-se a correção e a propriedade no emprego da linguagem. Deduz-se 1 (um) ponto para cada erro, com exceção das falhas de pontuação ou de ortografia, às quais corresponde dedução de 0,5 (meio) ponto por ocorrência. A atribuição de nota zero no quesito

“correção gramatical” implica, automaticamente, nota zero para a redação como um todo. Do mesmo modo, será atribuída nota zero às redações que demonstrarem baixo padrão de conhecimento da língua inglesa.

- **Organização e desenvolvimento de idéias (20 pontos)**

Serão considerados, principalmente, os itens a seguir:

- a) capacidade de raciocínio e de expressão clara em Inglês;
- b) pertinência das idéias e da eventual exemplificação em relação ao tema;
- c) adequada organização formal da redação, com adequada paragrafação.

Os candidatos devem esforçar-se para apresentar redação interessante. A originalidade não será exigida, mas será avaliada positivamente, da mesma forma que o uso adequado de exemplos. Serão severamente punidas as redações decoradas e simplesmente adaptadas ao tema proposto. A redação que fugir a esse tema será punida com nota zero.

- **Qualidade de linguagem (10 pontos)**

Atribuem-se pontos ao candidato pelo correto uso de Inglês idiomático, por construções variadas e pelo emprego de vocabulário amplo e preciso.

Os candidatos que usarem construções de cunho meramente elementar na redação receberão nota zero no quesito, em especial quando esse recurso for utilizado para evitar erros.

Bibliografia sugerida:

Jornais e revistas

A Internet permite o acesso a vasto número de publicações em língua inglesa. Para preparar-se para o concurso, é útil a leitura de publicações do padrão do *The Times* de Londres, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post e Guardian*, *The International Herald Tribune*, *The Financial Times*, *The Economist e Newsweek*. Pode-se encontrar a versão impressa de muitas dessas publicações em livrarias e bancas de revistas das principais cidades do País.

Dicionários de inglês

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Language Activator. Londres: Longman.

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. Londres: Longman.

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Cambridge Word Routes-Inglês/Português: Dicionário temático do inglês contemporâneo. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1996.

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Gramáticas

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CUTTS, M. **The Plain English Guide.** Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FRANK, M. **Modern English.** Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

LEECH, G.; SVARTVIK, J. **A Communicative Grammar of English.** Londres: Longman.

HILL, J.; LEWIS, M. (Orgs.) **LTP Dictionary of Selected Collocations.** Hove: Language Teaching Publications.

SANTOS, Agenor. **Guia Prático de Tradução Inglesa.** São Paulo: Cultrix.

SWAN, M. **A Practical English Usage.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.

THOMPSON, A. J.; MARTINET, A.V. **A Practical English Grammar.** Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Outras fontes

WALKER, S. B. **Candidate's Handbook: English.** Brasília: FUNAG, 2000.

Internet: Há numerosos dicionários e glossários disponíveis em linha, bem como variadas fontes de informações e de consulta. Duas referências iniciais, a título meramente indicativo:

<http://www.yourdictionary.com>;

<http://www.bbc.co.uk>

Prova de 2007

1 – TRANSLATION (Total: 30 marks)

A) (15 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following text adapted from John Cornwell's **Seminary Boy** (New York: Doubleday, 2006):

By late 1944, and after four wartime home removals, I was attending a Catholic primary school run by Irish nuns and spinsters, surrounded by a hostile world of unbelief. One Sunday a V-2 rocket destroyed a nearby Anglican church, killing most of the congregation.



The next day Miss Doonan, who taught us so piously to make the sign of the cross, informed us that these people had been struck down by God because they were Protestants.

The day before we celebrated the end of the war in Europe, I was humming to myself, skipping ahead of the girl who took me to school, when two bull terriers hurtled round the corner and sank their teeth into my plump legs. I spent the morning in a doctor's surgery being stitched up and painted with iodine. According to the policeman who visited our house on Victory Day, the dogs' owner claimed that I had made the animals bite me by my singing and dancing.

Marcílio Falcão Cavalcanti Filho (14/15)

No fim de 1944, após quatro mudanças de residência por causa da guerra, eu freqüentava uma escola primária administrada por solteironas e freiras irlandesas, cercada por um mundo hostil de descrença. Num domingo, um foguete V-2 destruiu uma igreja Anglicana que ficava próximo, matando a maior parte da congregação. No dia seguinte, a senhorita Doonan, que nos ensinou tão fervorosamente a fazer o sinal da cruz, informou-nos que aquelas pessoas haviam sido golpeadas por Deus porque eram protestantes.

Um dia antes de celebrarmos o fim da Guerra na Europa, eu estava cantando bem baixinho, pulando à frente da garota que me levava para a escola, quando dois cachorros da raça bull terrier pularam de trás da esquina e cravaram os dentes na minha perna roliça. Eu passei a manhã em um consultório médico levando pontos e pinceladas de iodo. De acordo com o policial que visitou nossa casa no Dia da Vitória, o dono dos cães afirmou que eu havia provocado a mordida dos animais com a minha dança e a minha música.

B) (15 marks)

Translate into English the following text adapted from Wilson Martins' **A Palavra Escrita** (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1996):

Não havia razão para que os gregos amassem e, por conseqüência, guardassem os seus próprios livros: Sócrates, como tantos outros, nada escreveu. Desprezando profundamente os "bárbaros", não havia igualmente razão para que amassem e, por conseqüência, procurassem guardar os livros estrangeiros. Assim, o povo letrado por excelência da Antiguidade, a pátria das letras e das artes, não possuía bibliotecas.

Para completar o paradoxo, é um povo militar e guerreiro, comerciante e prático, imediatista e político, que só admitia a palavra — escrita ou oral — como instrumento da ação, que vai, no mundo ocidental, possuir as melhores bibliotecas e, em particular, as primeiras bibliotecas públicas. Nisto, aliás, neste último traço, está gravado o caráter de um povo, voltado para a conquista do mundo e capaz de imediatamente perceber a utilidade de todas as armas: com os romanos, o livro passa da categoria sagrada para a categoria profana, deixa de ser intocável para ser condutor, e, posto ao alcance de todos, é o veículo por excelência das idéias, dos projetos e dos empreendimentos.

Janaína Monteiro de Barros Frederico (13,5/15)

There was no reason for the Greeks to love and therefore keep their own books. Socrates, like so many others, wrote nothing. Deeply despising "barbarians", there was neither reason for them to love and therefore preserve foreign books. Thus, the most remarkably literate people of the Ancient World had no libraries.



In order to render the paradox complete, the best libraries and particularly the first public libraries, in the Western World, will belong to a military and bellicose, trading and practical, immediatistic and political people, who only allowed for words – written or spoken – as instruments for action. Indeed, this last trait summarizes the character of a people driven for world conquest and capable of instantly perceiving the utility of all weapons: with the Romans, books leave the sacred sphere to enter the profane one, shed their aura of aloofness to become means, and, available to everyone, turn into the privileged vehicle of ideas, projects and enterprises.

2 – SUMMARY & TEXTUAL EXERCISES (Total: 25 marks)

A. Read the following text adapted from **Empires with Expiration Dates** by Niall Ferguson in FOREIGN POLICY, nr. 156 (Sept./Oct. 2006), and complete the exercises at the end. (10 marks)

B. Summarize the text, in your own words, in up to 200 words. (15 marks)

Empires, more than nation-states, are the principal actors on the stage of world history. Much of history consists of the deeds of the few score empires that once ruled alien peoples across large tracts of the globe. Yet the lifespan of empires has tended to decline. Compared with their predecessors, the empires of the last century were singularly shortlived. Reduced imperial life expectancy has profound implications for our own time.

Officially, there are no empires now, only 190-plus nation-states. Yet the ghosts of empires past continue to stalk the Earth. Regional conflicts are easily — nay, often glibly — explained in terms of imperial sins of yore: an arbitrary border here, a strategy of divide-and-rule there.

Moreover, many of today's most important states are still recognizably the progeny of empires. Imperial inheritance is apparent from the Russian Federation to Great Britain, Italy and Germany. India is the heir of the Mughal Empire and the British Raj, China the direct descendant of the Middle Kingdom. In the Americas, the imperial legacy is patent from Canada to Argentina.

Today's world, in short, is as much one of ex-empires and former colonies as it is of nation-states. Even institutions designed to reorder the world after 1945 have a distinctly imperial bent. For what _____ are the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council if not a cozy _____ of empires past? And what, pray, is "humanitarian intervention" if not a more politically correct-sounding version of the western empires' old "civilizing mission"?

Empires' life cycles and geographic reach are remarkably irregular. Whereas the average Roman empire lasted over 800 years, equivalents elsewhere before the modern age survived no more than half that time.

The empires forged in the 20th century, by contrast, were comparatively short. Why did they prove so ephemeral? The answer lies partly in the unprecedented degrees of centralized power, economic control, and social homogeneity to which the Communists in Russia and China, the Fascists in Germany and Italy and the expansionist Japanese aspired. They were not content with the haphazard administrative arrangements that had characterized the old empires. Though they inherited from the 19th-century nation-builders an insatiable appetite for uniformity, these new "empire states" repudiated religious and legal constraints on the use of force. They relished sweeping away old political institutions and existing social structures. Above all, they made a virtue of ruthlessness.



The empire states of the mid-20th century were to a considerable extent the architects of their own demise. In particular, the Germans and Japanese imposed their authority on other peoples with such unbridled ferocity that they undermined local collaboration thus laying the foundations for indigenous resistance. At the same time, their territorial ambitions were so boundless that they swiftly conjured into being an unassailable coalition of imperial rivals in the form of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Empires do not survive for long if they cannot establish and sustain local consent and if they allow more powerful coalitions of rival empires to unite against them. The crucial question is whether or not today's global powers behave differently from their imperial forebears.

Publicly, the leaders of the American and Chinese republics deny entertaining imperial designs. Both states are the product of revolutions and have entrenched anti-imperialist traditions. Yet the mask does slip on occasions. In 2004 a senior presidential advisor confided to a journalist: "We're an empire now and when we act, we create our own reality." Similar thoughts may cross the minds of China's leaders. In any case, it is perfectly possible for a republic to behave like an empire in practice, while remaining in denial about its loss of republican virtue.

A historical pattern of U.S. imperial intervention underpins the widespread assumption that the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq will not long outlast President Bush's term in office. Empire — especially unstated empire — is ephemeral in a way that sets our own age quite apart. In the American case, however, the real snag is not the alienation of conquered peoples or threats posed by rival empires (the prime solvents of other 20th-century empires) but domestic constraints.

These take three distinct forms.

The first can be classified as a troop deficit. The United States prefers to maintain a relatively small proportion of its population in the armed forces, at 0.5 percent. Moreover, only a small and highly trained part of this military is available for combat duties overseas. Members of this elite are not to be readily sacrificed. Nor are they easy to replace.

The second constraint on America's tacit empire is the burgeoning budget deficit. The costs of the war in Iraq have substantially exceeded the administration's forecast: \$290 billion since the invasion in 2003.

Finally, there is the attention deficit. Past empires were not sorely taxed to sustain public support for protracted conflicts. The American public, by contrast, tires quickly. It has taken less than 18 months for a majority of American voters to start viewing the invasion of Iraq as a mistake.

An empire will thrive and endure so long as the benefits of exerting power over foreign peoples outstrip the costs of doing so in the eyes of the imperialists; and so long as the benefits of knuckling under a foreign yoke exceed the costs of resistance in the eyes of the subjects. Such calculations implicitly take stock of the potential costs of relinquishing power to a rival empire.

For the time being, the costs of empire building look too high to most Americans while the benefits seem at best nebulous. Moreover, a rival equipped or willing to do the job is clearly wanting. With its republican institutions battered but still intact, the United States hardly passes muster as a latter-day Rome.

All that may change, however. In a world where natural resources are destined to become scarcer, the old mainsprings of imperial rivalry resist. Empire today is both unstated and unsung. History suggests, though, that the calculus of power could well swing back in its favor tomorrow.

Glauber David Vivas (15/15)

Despite the historical importance of empires, modern history has seen a marked decline in their lifespan. Today, nearly 200 nation-states exist and, officially, there are no empires.

Notwithstanding, the impact of empires on the modern world is pervasive. Many countries are the result of imperial actions of the past, as are many of today's conflicts. Even international organizations appear to be influenced by the offspring of empires.

The short-lived empires of the 20th Century were greatly responsible for their own downfall: their ruthlessness bred resistance and their expansionism contributed to the creation of opposing coalitions. Empires cannot overcome lack of local consent and powerful opponents.

The leaders of today's powers, such as China and America, deny having imperial intentions, thus the question of whether they behave differently when compared to their predecessors gains importance. In the American case, among several factors, one appears to make a significant difference: the lack of popular support for long wars.

Empires exist only while imperialists and their subjects believe there is a benefit. The American people's lack of support for long conflicts seems to prevent imperial designs. Notwithstanding, the increasing scarcity of resources could change that picture, and empires could stage a comeback.

TEXTUAL EXERCISES (Total: 10 marks, 2 per correct answer)

a) Fill in each of the two gaps in paragraph four of the text above with an appropriate word or phrase:

“For what truly are the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council if not a cozy gathering of empires past?”

b) Choose the most appropriate substitute in context for the words underlined in paragraph twelve:

I. **taxed**: “Past empires were not sorely **taxed** to sustain public support for protracted conflicts.”

- 1) drained
- 2) compelled
- 3) levied
- 4) hurt
- 5) pressed**

II. **protracted**: “Past empires were not sorely taxed to sustain public support for **protracted** conflicts.”

- 1) dreadful
- 2) damaging
- 3) drawn out**
- 4) costly
- 5) withering

c) Re-write the following sentence from the antepenultimate paragraph of the text starting as indicated below:

“An empire will thrive and endure so long as the benefits of exerting power over foreign peoples outstrip the costs of doing so in the eyes of the imperialists.”
Only when the benefits of the exercise of power over alien civilizations outweigh their price in the eyes of the conquerors, will an empire grow or survive.

3 – COMPOSITION (Total 45 marks)

Write a composition on the following quotation from Albert Einstein:

“The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”
 (Length: 350-450 words)

Felipe Krause Dornelles (45/45)

When Marx stated that revolutions were the locomotives of history, he probably envisaged the technical and scientific revolutions that would alter the course of human actions and thought. What he could not foresee, however, was the boundless destructive capacity of the atom bomb. While developments in nuclear technology have permitted many countries to expand an otherwise deficient energy base, the world continues to fear the prospect of a nuclear war. The end of the Cold War may have somewhat dissipated that fear, but the bellicose tendencies of political leaders are a constant source of preoccupation.

Many argue today that scientific experiments with nuclear fission have produced more good than evil. Principal in what pertains to the former is the enlarged capacity which some countries now have to produce energy. With nuclear power, it is possible to provide electricity to more people at a lower cost, especially given the rising prices of fossil fuels used in thermal plants. The environmental effects, though ultimately ambiguous, are visually pleasing: less smoke and a reduction of coal mining in what have once again become pleasant rural landscapes.

Some of these arguments, however, are difficult to sustain. On the one hand, while the European countryside seems to be regaining its idyllic wilderness, much of the nuclear waste produced is being exported to poorer countries, which have found a new, though immensely risky, source of income. On the other hand, it has not been clearly shown by world leaders that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh the dangers of stockpiling and testing nuclear warheads. One is led to question whether nuclear experiments should be banned altogether.

The problem lies in the repeated demonstrations of irresponsible behavior by Western and non-Western leaders alike. Some countries, such as North Korea and Iran, have been deemed “rogue states” for their disregard of international norms regulating nuclear experiments. Western leaders, however, also defy societal beliefs and needs, as they undermine world peace by maintaining arsenals and, at least until the 1990s, conducting explosions. This attitude seems to reflect an unchanging militaristic mindset within most governments and, possibly, a significant portion of voters.



Pacifist leaders and intellectuals are, indeed, either lacking or not given enough voice. Albert Einstein himself was a vocal critic of the military uses of nuclear technology. Post-war norms which began to govern the use of this technology were imbued with a spirit of peace and development. It is this spirit which should today prevail.

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Exemplos de temas para redação em anos anteriores:

2006

Awareness that change is a constant feature of human life is as old as civilisation. However, more recently, technological development has greatly enhanced both the prospects for rapid change and the range of its social, political, and cultural impact.

Bearing this in mind, **comment on Berman's contention** (in Muqtedar Khan's text "Radical Islam, Liberal Islam" in section 2 above) **that "those motivated by aversion for liberalism will continue to seek the downfall of the West as long as its culture continues to influence the world, the Muslim World in particular"**.

2005

Read the following editorial from the *Washington Post*, 20th March, 2005, and in the light of it and of the text by Richard Gott in section 2, **comment on the geopolitical, social, and economic issues raised as they affect South American integration.**

A Threat to Latin Democracy

Another Latin American democracy is on the verge of crumbling under pressure from leftist populism. The trouble comes this time in Bolivia, where a democratic president and Congress face a paralyzing mix of strikes and roadblocks by a radical movement opposed to foreign investment and free-market capitalism. The insurgents, who claim to represent the country's indigenous population, drove one democratically elected president from office 18 months ago; now they are working on his successor, Carlos Mesa, who has searched valiantly but unsuccessfully for compromise. The populists ride a leftist wave of momentum in Latin America and have the rhetorical, and possibly material, support of the region's self-styled "Bolivarian" revolutionary, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The democrats could use some outside help, from their neighbors and the United States.

Accounts of political crises in Andean countries such as Bolivia sometimes portray a poor and disenfranchised indigenous majority pitted against an ethnically European and mestizo elite. The facts tell a different story in Bolivia. Mr. Mesa, polls show, has the support of two-thirds of his compatriots, while the party leading the protests, the Movement Toward Socialism, has never received more than 21 percent of the vote in an election. Nor is it the case that Bolivia's experiment with free-market policies in the 1990s failed to help the poor. Per capita incomes rose by 20 percent in the second half of the decade. Thanks to private foreign investment, significantly more Bolivians gained access to water, sewage systems and electricity.

The populist minority, led by former coca farmer Evo Morales, is bent on using force to reverse that progress. Already it has effectively blocked natural gas exports to the United



States. Its current strikes are aimed at stopping further foreign investment in that industry through confiscatory taxes and reversing the privatization of other industries. Mr. Mesa, swearing off the use of force to break up the roadblocks, has countered with democratic political tactics: first a national referendum on a compromise gas policy, then an accord with Congress on political and economic reforms. Last week, in desperation, he proposed that his own term as president be cut short and new elections be held in August; Congress rejected the proposal, and Mr. Mesa later announced he would stay on. But the opposition still threatens to renew a blockade that is devastating one of the hemisphere's poorest economies and prompting talk of secession in Bolivia's relatively prosperous and pro-capitalist eastern provinces.

All of this is good news for Mr. Chavez, who along with Cuba's Fidel Castro dreams of a new bloc of Latin "socialist" (i.e., undemocratic) regimes that will join with like-minded states such as Iran, Libya and China to oppose the United States. Bolivia's neighbors, including Brazil, Argentina and Chile, ought to be alarmed by this trend; but though their own leftist governments have expressed support for Mr. Mesa they have refrained from more concerted action -- such as demanding that Mr. Chavez cease his meddling. The State Department issued a statement last week expressing "support for the people of Bolivia and a peaceful democratic process." If there is a deeper U.S. policy to head off the breakdown of democracy in Latin America, there isn't much sign of it.

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